Fix potential overflow in CertificateRequest

This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2015-10-02 11:16:47 +02:00
parent 54eec9d1dd
commit bc1babb387
2 changed files with 14 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS 2.1.2 released 2015-10-xx = mbed TLS 2.1.2 released 2015-10-xx
Security
* Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client
authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely
unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth.
Found by Guido Vranken.
Changes Changes
* Fixed paths for check_config.h in example config files. (Found by bachp) * Fixed paths for check_config.h in example config files. (Found by bachp)
(#291) (#291)

View file

@ -2351,6 +2351,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
unsigned char *buf, *p; unsigned char *buf, *p;
const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
int authmode; int authmode;
@ -2471,10 +2472,14 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
total_dn_size = 0; total_dn_size = 0;
while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 )
{ {
if( p - buf > 4096 )
break;
dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len;
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
break;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size ); *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size );
memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size );